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INTRODUCTION
In late January 2013, the Third District Court of Appeal sent
shockwaves throughout the real estate community with regards to
condominium associations’ rights as unit owners. In Aventura
Management, LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean Condominium Association1
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for always helping me out along the way.
1. 105 So. 3d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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(Spiaggia), the appellate court interpreted Florida Statute § 718.1162 in
an unprecedented way. The court held that if a condominium
association takes title to a unit before the bank forecloses on a
defaulting unit owner, the association is jointly and severally liable for
all past due assessments with the previous owner that came due, up to
the time of transfer of title.3 Condominium associations across Florida4
became worried that the Spiaggia decision could spark a judicial trend
that limits associations’ ability to recoup delinquent assessment fees.5
Although the Spiaggia court likely ruled correctly from an appellate
perspective, the outcome of the case is contrary to the legislative intent
of § 718.116 and could have disastrous consequences for Florida
condominium associations.
This Comment begins by explaining in great detail the facts and
procedural posture of Spiaggia from the trial court to the appellate court
level. Following the factual analysis, this Comment discusses the
potential and actual effects of Spiaggia and looks to the legislative
intent of § 718.116 to attempt to resolve the existing conflict. Finally,
this Comment raises various issues that the Florida Legislature should
address in reaction to the Spiaggia decision.
I. The Facts: Aventura Management, LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean
Condominium Association
A. Trial Court Analysis
To understand why the Spiaggia decision may have profound effects
on Florida condominium associations, it is first necessary to examine
the dispute between Aventura and Spiaggia. In July 2008, Spiaggia
initiated lien foreclosure proceedings against the owner of unit number
402 (Unit) because of past due assessments6 owed to Spiaggia Ocean
Condominium Association.7 Accordingly, in July of 2009, Spiaggia
2. FLA. STAT. § 718.116 (2009).
3. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638.
4. Cf. James L. Oliver, Beyond Consumer Protection: The Application of the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act to Condominium Sales, 37 FLA. L. REV. 945, 945–46 (1985)
(stating that Florida has consistently led the nation in condominium sales and modification of
condominium law).
5. Roberto C. Blanch, Condo Association Laws Need a Legislative Fix, MIAMI HERALD
(Mar. 3, 2013).
6. Condo Assessments, OWNACONDO, http://www.ownacondo.com/Assessments.aspx
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (noting that “[c]ondo[minium] assessments, sometimes called
association fees, are the payments made by condominium owners to cover the common
expenses of the entire property,” which may include water charges, gas charges, building
maintenance fees, and parking lot cleaning fees, among others).
7. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 637.
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acquired a default final judgment of foreclosure against the Unit owner
and a foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 17, 2009.8 The
holder of the first mortgage on the Unit, the Bank of New York (Bank),
subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings in September 2009
against the original owner of the Unit and named Spiaggia as a
defendant.9
At the scheduled foreclosure sale, Spiaggia placed the sole bid to
take title of the Unit subject to the first mortgage held by the Bank.10
Spiaggia had standing to take title because under § 718.116(5)(a), “[t]he
association has a lien on each condominium parcel to secure the
payment of assessments.”11 Thus, apart from when there is an atypical
condominium association agreement, almost every condominium
association has a statutory lien on its units as a way to enforce payment
of assessment fees that are levied on unit owners. No other parties
submitted a bid, most likely because the first mortgage, “far exceeded
the value of the Unit.”12 Typically only parties with a direct interest in
the sale are willing to bid for a title subject to a mortgage that is much
greater than the value of the property. Third parties usually bid on an
overvalued mortgage only if the party can acquire title through an
inexpensive bid or if that party foresees the value of the property
significantly appreciating over the duration of the mortgage.13 However,
at the time of the foreclosure sale (December 2009), the Florida real
estate market was collapsing and the Florida condominium market was
especially feeling the effects.14 Thus, it is not surprising that Spiaggia
took title to the Unit because although the mortgage was overvalued,
Spiaggia had an interest in the property because it was a primary way
for the condominium association to generate revenue through its
assessment fees.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 638.
11. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(5)(a) (2009); Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 639.
12. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638.
13. Another reason a third party investor may try and bid on a mortgage that far exceeds
the value of the property is if the purpose of the investment is long-term. What that typically
means is the investor is planning on generating income from the property after the mortgage has
been paid off, enough so to justify the cost of the overvalued mortgage.
14. Harriet Johnson Brackey, South Florida’s Condo Crisis: Prices at Seven-Year Lows,
PALM BEACH POST (Apr. 18, 2010, 9:29 AM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/business/
real-estate/south-floridas-condo-crisis-prices-at-seven-year-l/nL6Mr/; see also Prashant Gopal,
2009 Real Estate Forecast: Troubles Spread, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 23, 2008),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-12-23/2009-real-estate-forecast-troubles-spreadbus
inessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
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After acquiring title, Spiaggia, like most condominium associations,
leased the Unit in order to generate income.15 Put another way, Spiaggia
attempted to mitigate its losses from a defaulting unit owner by
temporarily acquiring title to the Unit and leasing the Unit as opposed to
leaving the Unit vacant and not collecting any assessment fees. The
Bank subsequently acquired a final judgment of foreclosure, and a
second foreclosure sale was set for September 30, 2010.16 At the second
foreclosure sale, Aventura was the successful bidder and acquired title
to the Unit, “at which point [Spiaggia] relinquished its ownership
interest.”17 After Aventura obtained title to the Unit, Spiaggia sought to
recover from Aventura any “past due assessments, late fees, and interest
that had accrued since the original owner defaulted.”18
Spiaggia asserted that Aventura was a third-party purchaser and thus
was liable under § 718.116(1)(a) of Florida’s Condominium Act.19
Aventura claimed that contrary to Spiaggia’s interpretation of
§ 718.116(1)(a), it was not liable for past due assessments and
countered that Spiaggia was responsible for the assessments owed by
the original owner.20 Aventura explained that because Spiaggia was the
intervening owner between the original Unit owner and Aventura, a
literal interpretation of the statute dictates that Spiaggia is “liable for all
assessments which come due while he or she is the unit owner.”21
Seeking clarification, Aventura brought a declaratory judgment
action asking for an interpretation of § 718.116(1)(a) and arguing that it

15. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638.
16. Id. The Bank in effect holds the “true” title to the unit and the condominium
association holds a statutory lien on the unit to force unit owners to pay assessment fees. If the
condominium association did not have a statutory lien, then Banks or mortgagees would be
responsible for forcing owners to pay assessment fees—something that mortgagees have no
direct interest in. Thus, without some legal method to force unit owners to pay assessment fees,
the condominium association would have trouble maintaining the premises because garnering
assessment fees would be quite difficult.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a) (2009).
A unit owner, regardless of how his or her title has been acquired . . . is liable
for all assessments which come due while he or she is the unit owner.
Additionally, a unit owner is jointly and severally liable with the previous
owner for all unpaid assessments that came due up to the time of transfer of
title. This liability is without prejudice to any right the owner may have to
recover from the previous owner the amounts paid by the owner.
FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a).
20. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638.
21. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a).
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was liable only for assessments accruing after it took title to the Unit.22
After both parties moved for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in
favor of Spiaggia, holding that Spiaggia’s “lien did not merge with the
certificate of title it was issued in connection with its foreclosure
action.”23 The trial court further explained that Aventura was “liable for
all amounts owed as of the date it was issued the certificate of title,
including amounts accruing while [Spiaggia] held title, less all amounts
received by [Spiaggia] through rents or other mitigation efforts.”24 The
trial court concluded its holding by stating that contrary to the language
of § 718.116(1)(a), Spiaggia was not jointly and severally liable to
Aventura for any amount.25
B. Appellate Court Analysis
1. Majority Opinion: “There’s a New Sheriff in Town”
Aventura, feeling amiss because of the extra payments it was then
legally responsible for, filed an appeal to the Third District Court of
Appeal, arguing that the trial court incorrectly interpreted
§ 718.116(1)(a) and Spiaggia should be responsible for the past due
assessments.26 Shocking condominium associations across Florida, the
appellate court agreed with Aventura and held Spiaggia jointly and
severally liable for the past due assessments from the time the original
Unit owner had title to when Spiaggia relinquished its ownership
interest to Aventura.27
The appellate court’s reasoning focused on four issues: (1) the
interpretation of § 718.116(1)(a); (2) whether Spiaggia’s lien merged
with its certificate of title issued at the December 2009 foreclosure sale;
(3) if there is an exception to the statute when the condominium
association itself is an owner; and (4) whether Aventura was on notice
as to the amounts owed on the Unit.28
The appellate court began its analysis by interpreting the language of
§ 718.116(1)(a). It held that the language, “a unit owner is jointly and
severally liable with the previous owner for all unpaid assessments that
came due up to the time of transfer of title,” was “plain” and should be

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638.
Id.
Id. at 638 n.3.
Id. at 638.
Id.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 638–40.
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applied literally.29 Thus, regardless of intent or who the previous owner
actually was, as long as a person was by law the previous owner, that
person should be held jointly and severally liable for all unpaid
assessments up to the transfer of title.
After establishing its interpretation of the statute, the appellate court
addressed Spiaggia’s first argument that “its lien did not merge with the
certificate of title issued at the December 2009 foreclosure sale.”30
Spiaggia presented case law that ruled merger exists only where the
parties demonstrate a clear intent for merger to take place.31 However,
the appellate court distinguished this case law by explaining that those
cases did not involve mortgage foreclosure actions like the instant
case.32 The court went further and presented case law that held a
mortgage merges with a final judgment of foreclosure and is
extinguished by the sale of the underlying property.33 The court
acknowledged that the lien survives the foreclosure as recognized by
statute, but emphasized that the statute dictates “that the prior owner is
jointly and severally liable with the current owner for all past due
assessments up to the time of the transfer of title.”34
The third issue addressed by the appellate court was whether an
exception should be read into § 718.116(1)(a) when the condominium
association itself is an owner.35 Spiaggia argued that § 718.116(1)(a) is
one part of a “general framework . . . designed to provide condominium
associations with a mechanism for the preservation of their rights with
regard to fee assessments.”36 Spiaggia then referenced § 718.116(5)(a)
and § 718.116(6)(a) as textual support for its argument that “the sole
purpose of this statutory scheme is to provide condominium
associations with the means by which they can protect their interests,
and that it would be absurd to apply the Statute in . . . a way [that
29. Id. at 638 (emphasis in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a) (2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Lassiter v. Kaufman, 581 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. 1991) (“[A]n intention that
a transaction operate as a merger is essential to a merger in equity.”) (emphasis added) and
Contos v. Lipsky, 433 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“In the absence of evidence
showing an express or implied intent, we must presume that the lessee . . . intended the result
most beneficial to her, that is, no merger.”)).
32. Id. at 639.
33. Id. (citing One 79th St. Estates, Inc. v. Am. Inv. Servs., 47 So. 3d 886, 889 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (“When a mortgage is foreclosed, the mortgage is ‘merged’ into the final
judgment and loses its separate identity.”) and Nack Holdings, LLC v. Kalb, 13 So. 3d 92, 94
n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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would] deprive a condominium association of its right to collect past
due assessments.”37 The appellate court, however, did not agree with
Spiaggia’s compelling argument.
The court explained that § 718.116(1)(a) provides a remedy for
condominium associations faced with owners in default by listing
“current owners and prior owners” as a class of persons from whom a
condominium association can demand relief for delinquent
assessments.38 The court justified this reasoning through a free-market,
libertarian analysis. The court explained that nowhere in the
condominium statute does it “require[] a condominium association to
position itself as the current or prior owner.”39 Rather, the predicament
that fell upon Spiaggia was a result of “external market forces, namely
that condominium associations may find . . . that no one is willing to bid
on a foreclosed unit at foreclosure sale.”40 Regardless of the
impracticability, the court goes further in a footnote to explain that
nothing in the condominium statute prevents Spiaggia from trying to
collect unpaid assessments from the prior owner whom Spiaggia
purchased the Unit from.41 The court does not provide any context as to
how realistic this option may be and thus fittingly hid this somewhat
obvious but impractical suggestion in a footnote.42
Lastly, the appellate court addressed whether the issue of notice has
any effect on Aventura’s liability for the unpaid assessments. Spiaggia
argued that Aventura was on notice of the amounts owed on the Unit
and thus knew the liabilities associated with the Unit it purchased.43 The
court struck down this argument by stating that nothing in the record
demonstrates that Aventura knew it would be entirely responsible for
the unpaid assessments as a result of purchasing the property.44 The
court reasoned that Aventura purchased the Unit understanding there
were liabilities attached to it, but because § 718.116(1)(a) allows for
“joint and several liability,” Aventura should not bear the entire burden
of past due assessments.45 Thus, after narrowly interpreting
§ 718.116(1)(a) and disagreeing with the arguments raised by Spiaggia,
the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and held Spiaggia
jointly and severally liable for past due assessments up until it
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. n.4.
Id.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.
Id.
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relinquished its title to Aventura.46
2. Dissenting Opinion: Judge Shepherd’s Understandable
Empathy
Although agreeing with parts of the majority opinion, Judge Frank
A. Shepherd was not satisfied with the outcome of the case and used
legislative intent and statutory interpretation to reach a different
conclusion. The dissent agreed with the majority that Spiaggia’s
statutory lien, justified by § 718.116(5)(a), survives the foreclosure.47
Next, the dissent identified that the majority interpreted “the prior
owner” to be Spiaggia, and because the prior owner “is jointly and
severally liable with the current owner for all past due assessments up to
the time of the transfer of title,” Spiaggia is partially responsible for the
past due assessments.48 The dissent then wondered, “what happen[ed]
to the lien?”49 Judge Shepherd goes on to say that contrary to the
majority opinion, there is “a way to give meaning to both the statutory
lien in subsection 5(a) and the statutory language of subsection
(1)(a).”50
Using reliable statutory interpretation principles, the dissent began
its analysis by noting that constructing laws to give effect to every
clause and part thereof is typically favored.51 Applying this principle,
the dissent found that the legislative purpose of § 718.116 was to “assist
condominium associations to be made whole in the collection of past
due assessments, while . . . [also] not unduly impairing the value of
collateral held by first mortgagees.”52 This is evidenced by the
legislature giving condominium associations statutory liens over units
that are under the association’s jurisdiction.53 Using these logical
deductions, the dissent asserted that third-party purchasers “are subject
to old-fashioned caveat emptor principles.”54 The third-party buyers’
“protection lies in satisfying themselves before purchase, whether by
contract or judicial sale, of the status of past-due assessments on the
unit.”55
46. Id.
47. Id. (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (quoting id. at 639 (majority opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id. “A corollary to this rule, of course, is that a construction that would leave without
effect part of the language used should be rejected if possible.” Id. (citing State v. M.M., 407 So.
2d 987, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. Caveat emptor is the common law “doctrine holding that purchasers buy at their
own risk.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
55. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 640 (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
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The crux of the dissent’s divergence from the majority opinion
focused on Judge Shepherd’s interpretation of § 718.116(6)(a).
Reinforcing the notion that statutory interpretation is a “holistic
endeavor,” the dissent found that § 718.116(1)(a) and (6)(a) are
compatible with one another.56 What Judge Shepherd meant by this was
that joint and several liability between Aventura and Spiaggia
(§ 718.116(1)(a)) and Spiaggia’s option to enforce its existing statutory
lien right (§ 718.116(6)(a)) are both options that Spiaggia can choose to
execute. Section 718.116(6)(a) explicitly states that, “[t]he association
may bring an action in its name to foreclose a lien for assessments in the
manner a mortgage of real property is foreclosed and may also bring an
action to recover a money judgment for unpaid assessments without
waiving any claim of lien.”57 Thus, using principles of statutory
interpretation, the dissent asserted that § 718.116(6)(a) is evidence that
the legislature intended to make condominium associations whole, and
Judge Shepherd felt that this evidence held more weight than relying on
the ambiguous term “previous owner” that is fundamental to the
majority’s analysis.58 In conclusion, the dissent would affirm the trial
court’s holding.59
II. Immediate Effects from the Spiaggia Decision
After the Third District Court of Appeal released the Spiaggia
opinion, many real estate attorneys were in disbelief.60 It was almost as
if condominium associations were on their way to not being able to
collect past due assessment fees from any future purchaser. Luckily, the
court’s holding did not reach this far and Spiaggia applies only in a
specific set of circumstances.61
Spiaggia applies only if the condominium association foreclosed
upon its statutory lien and took title to the property, and the bank that
held the first mortgage, “completed its foreclosure action and sold the
property at public auction.”62 Then, at the public auction, a third-party
bidder purchased the property from the bank.63 The crux of this fact56. Id. at 641.
57. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(6)(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
58. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 641 & n.6 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
59. Id. at 641.
60. E.g., PeytonBolin Legal Update—Aventura Management LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean
Condominium Association, PEYTONBOLIN PL, http://www.peytonbolin.com/2013/01/
peytonbolin-legal-update-aventura-management-llc-v-spiaggia-ocean-condominium-association/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014) [hereinafter PeytonBolin].
61. Id. (concluding similarly).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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specific scenario is that the condominium association takes title to the
property before the third party purchases the property at the bank
foreclosure sale because, according to Spiaggia, this qualifies the
association as an intervening owner.64 Being the intervening owner
between the original defaulting owner and the third-party purchaser
means the association is “jointly and severally liable with the [original
defaulting] owner for all unpaid assessments.”65 Thus, as opposed to
holding the party who purchased the first mortgage (from essentially the
defaulting owner) liable for past due assessments, the association is held
liable for the assessment fees simply because of the order in which the
association temporarily took title. As will be explained later, this
emphasis on the order of who took title seems to stray away from the
overall purpose of § 718.116, which is to make the condominium
association at least partially whole.
Spiaggia will primarily affect how condominium associations handle
defaulting unit owners in the future. Traditionally, associations have
“avoided acquiring properties through their own foreclosure actions for
the past-due fees, given that lenders typically moved quickly on their
foreclosure actions and the associations’ ability to recover delinquent
fees is limited under the law.”66 However, because of the rise in
foreclosures, judicial backlog and “dilatory tactics of homeowners and
counsel”67 data shows that it takes an average of 2.5 years for banks to
complete foreclosures in Florida.68 What does this mean for defaulting
unit owners? Typically, it allows for substantial periods of “free rent”
where the association is waiting on the bank to foreclose its lien and the
unit owner takes advantage of that wait by not paying any assessment
fees to the association.69 Furthermore, banks are typically not in a hurry
to complete the foreclosure process, obtain title to the unit, and begin
paying fees associated with unit ownership.70 This is evidenced when
banks search for note purchasers and essentially try to short sale their
interest in the property in order to “stem their losses.”71

64. Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638.
65. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a) (2009).
66. Blanch, supra note 5.
67. Peter P. Hargitai, Gotcha! Associations Corner Mortgagees for Past Due Assessments,
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Jan. 2013, at 19, 20.
68. Blanch, supra note 5; cf. Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted En Masse: Collateral
Damage Arising From the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 976 (2010)
(discussing how banks are ignoring market conditions if they think opting for foreclosure
actions against landlords/renters is their best option).
69. Hargitai, supra note 67, at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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In response to these long delays, condominium associations began
moving quickly to obtain ownership of the defaulting owners’ units
before the banks completed the foreclosure process.72 Associations did
so to mitigate the lost revenue that associations had already suffered.
Thus, instead of letting the unit either stay vacant or worse, have the
defaulting owner stay there “rent free,” associations can acquire title
and lease the units to recover assessment fees that would otherwise not
be available if the association had sat idle and waited for the bank to
complete the timely foreclosure process. This not only benefits the
association economically, but it helps “bring back the sense of
community that condominium living promotes [and] [n]on-delinquent
unit owners generally care for their units.”73
Once the bank eventually completes their foreclosure, the
association has received assessment fees (income) for sometimes up to
three years, and thus is much better off than if they had just waited for
the bank to obtain title to the unit.74 Additionally, associations were also
able to bill the new owner (as a result of the bank’s foreclosure) for the
past due fees that the defaulting owner owed the association. This
process was completed in accordance with the “safe harbor” provision
of § 718.116(1)(b)(1). Under the safe harbor provision, the liability of
the first mortgagee is limited to the lesser of either the fees that accrued
during the twelve months immediately preceding the acquisition of title
or one percent of the original mortgage debt.75 Thus, by acquiring title,
the association could collect both assessment fees from leasing the unit
to new owners and could bill the new third-party owners in accordance
with the § 718.116 “safe harbor” provision. In short, the association
was able to retain financial stability in the event of defaulting unit
owners.
However, Spiaggia drastically changes this process. If the
association acquires title to the unit before the bank completes the
foreclosure process (thereby becoming an intervening owner), the
Spiaggia court holds that associations are then responsible for the past
due assessments of the defaulting owner.76 Thus, condominium
associations have to carefully weigh their options. If an association
predicts it may take in more money from leasing a unit than it would
receive from the bank or a third-party investor under the safe harbor
provision, then, and only then, should the association obtain title to the
72. Blanch, supra note 5.
73. Hargitai, supra note 67, at 22.
74. Blanch, supra note 5.
75. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(b)(1) (2009).
76. Aventura Mgmt., LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean Condo. Ass’n, 105 So. 3d 637, 638–39 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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unit.77 This prediction can sometimes be difficult to determine, but the
Spiaggia decision places the onus on the association to make this
decision, even if it results in the association recouping much less
delinquent fees than anticipated. Is this the purpose of § 718.116?
Should the burden be on the association, who is typically the innocent
party in a unit foreclosure proceeding? These issues are examined in the
following section, which analyzes the latent ambiguities of § 718.116.
III. The Legislative Intent Behind Florida Statute § 718.116
In recent years, Florida Statute § 718.116 has plagued attorneys and
courts alike with its provisions that are sometimes difficult to interpret
because of their ambiguous meanings. In particular, the question of
whom condominium associations can collect delinquent assessments
from during the foreclosure process has caused a great deal of
confusion. According to the majority opinion in Spiaggia, the
determination of who is responsible for unpaid assessments is
exclusively answered in subsection (1)(a) of § 718.116.78 This is a result
of the majority’s strict interpretation of § 718.116(1)(a), but as the
Spiaggia dissent points out, statutory interpretation is a “holistic
endeavor.”79 Furthermore, § 718.116(1)(a) does not explain if “unit
owner” or “previous owner” can be the actual condominium association
itself and whether § 718.116(6)(a) has any effect on subsection (1)(a).80
These latent ambiguities can be resolved using principles of statutory
interpretation, which dictate that “[t]he primary guide to statutory
interpretation is to determine the purpose of the legislature.”81
A. Conflicting Viewpoints?
“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and
conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting
to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction . . . .”82 This, put
simply, is not applicable to § 718.116. If it were, the groundbreaking
Spiaggia decision would not have made headlines across South Florida
because the legal community would have expected the appellate court to
rule in accordance with the typical interpretation of § 718.116.83 The
confusion surrounding § 718.116 focuses on whether the Florida
legislature “intended to make a purchaser who acquired the property via
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

PeytonBolin, supra note 60.
Spiaggia, 105 So. 3d at 638.
Id. at 641 (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a), (6)(a).
Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833, 836 (Fla. 1963).
A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931).
See, e.g., Blanch, supra note 5; PeytonBoylin, supra note 60.
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foreclosure . . . jointly and severally liable with the previous owner for
all unpaid assessments” if that purchaser was the condominium
association itself.84 Because the answer to this is unclear, the first step
in interpreting § 718.116 is to examine the legislative history of the
statute.
Unfortunately, the legislative history seems to suggest mixed
purposes behind the creation and amendments to § 718.116. To begin,
the legislative intent behind § 718.116(1)(a) does not appear to weigh in
favor of the condominium association. Since the statute’s creation, the
language “regardless of how his or her title has been acquired” has not
been materially amended and implies that subsection (1)(a) is an allinclusive provision, no matter what the status of the “unit owner”
actually is.85 This assumption is bolstered when looking at the 1991
amendment that added “a unit owner is jointly and severally liable with
the previous owner for all unpaid assessments that came due up to the
time of transfer of title.”86 The legislative history suggests that the
lawmakers were not concerned with who the unit owner actually was,
but were more interested in categorizing what the unit owner was
responsible for upon becoming a bona fide “unit owner.”
However, the legislative history presents a different view when
examining the July 1, 2010 amendments made to § 718.116.87 In
particular, the amendment to § 718.116(1)(b)(1) illustrates the
legislature’s desire to provide a mechanism allowing community
associations to collect past due assessments.88 The 2010 amendment
extends the period of time an association can collect assessments from a
first mortgagee, its successor, or an assignee from six months to twelve
months immediately preceding that person’s acquisition of title.89 This
statutory change demonstrates the legislature’s intent to increase the
scope of the association’s recovery for delinquent assessments in
addition to increasing the liability of purchasers. This falls in line with
the legislative purpose Judge Shepherd discussed in his Spiaggia
84. Ambiguity of Florida Statute § 718.116 and Its Impact on Community Associations’
Ability To Collect Unpaid Assessments (Spring 2011 Litigation Quarterly), COLE, SCOTT &
KISSANE, P.A. (May 18, 2011), http://www.csklegal.com/quarterly/publications/ambiguity-offlorida-statute-%C2%A7-718-116-and-its-impact-on-community-associations%E2%80%99-abil
ity-to-collect-unpaid-assessments/.
85. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a); see Act of June 22, 1976, ch. 76-222, sec. 1, § 718.116,
1976 Fla. Laws 414, 426 (“A unit owner, regardless of how title is acquired, including a
purchaser at a judicial sale, shall be liable for all assessments coming due while he is the unit
owner.”).
86. PeytonBolin, supra note 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 6

1744

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

dissent. Judge Shepherd noted that “the fundamental purpose of the
Legislature in promulgating section 718.116 was to assist condominium
associations to be made whole in the collection of past due assessments,
while at the same time not unduly impairing the value of collateral held
by first mortgagees.”90 This interpretation, however, seems to conflict
with the legislative intent behind § 718.116(1)(a) discussed above.
Therefore, the question becomes, how do we reconcile these two
conflicting views when looking at the legislative purpose behind
§ 718.116 as a whole?
B. Resolving the Conflicting Purposes
The answer is simple and makes sense when viewed in the context of
history: the Florida Legislature clearly did not envision associations as
actual owners of these types of properties. Yes, condominium
associations have statutory liens over every unit, which some may argue
qualifies them as “quasi-owners;” but the only reason they have these
statutory liens over the units is to have a reliable method of enforcing
unit owners to pay their assessment fees. As Attorney Peter Hargitai put
it, “the drafters did not envision a condominium market saturated with
100 percent financing, negative equity, and underfunded
associations.”91
Thus, when looking at § 718.116(1)(a)—although the legislative
history suggests that its purpose is all inclusive (i.e., “all unit owners”
without exception)—the legislature meant this provision to apply to unit
owners under the notion that condominium associations would never be
considered “unit owners.” This is because, up until 2008, condominium
associations were practically never “unit owners” as used in
§ 718.116(1)(a). It was almost never worthwhile to acquire title as a
condominium association because banks typically moved quickly
through foreclosure and safe harbor provisions limited associations’
ability to recover past due fees.92 Thus, if condominium associations
were never “unit owners,” then drafting a provision that would have no
real world application would be pointless for the Florida Legislature.
Unfortunately, the conditions of the Florida condominium market have
drastically changed and thus the legislature must act accordingly to
clarify exactly how condominium associations fit within the purview of
§ 718.116.

90. Aventura Mgmt., LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean Condo. Ass’n, 105 So. 3d 637, 640 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
91. Hargitai, supra note 67, at 20.
92. Blanch, supra note 5.
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CONCLUSION
Taking into consideration all of the arguments raised by both parties
at the trial and appellate court level, the end result seems to have been
the strictly correct one. Using a literal interpretation of § 718.116, the
court correctly applied subsection (1)(a) to the facts of the case.
Although provisions of § 718.116 were sometimes ambiguous as
applied to the facts of Spiaggia, the legislative intent was too opaque to
allow the court to deviate from the grounded statutory language.
Scholarly analysis and legislative history do partially weigh in favor of
giving broader powers to associations for recovering past due
assessments, but a court interpreting § 718.116 literally does not allow
for much speculation as to how the legislature intended § 718.116 to
apply to unit owners who were also condominium associations.
Spiaggia’s best argument was that its statutory lien merged with the
certificate of title, but unfortunately, the remedy presented to the court
that could potentially facilitate the compatibility between
§ 718.116(1)(a) and § 718.116(6)(a) was unpersuasive.
Although the logically correct analysis decided the holding of the
appellate court, the outcome was not consistent with the legislative
purpose of § 718.116. The legislative history does not indicate a strong
preference towards associations’ rights as unit owners because the
drafters never envisioned a situation where associations obtaining title
themselves would be more beneficial than waiting for the banks to
foreclose on the defaulting owners. It is imperative that the Florida
Legislature amends § 718.116 to account for this type of situation
presented in Spiaggia because without clarification, condominium
associations will be at the mercy of the courts whose only guidance is
an outdated statute.
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